CODERED VTA

Siemens SIMATIC Products Exposed to NTLM Relay Attacks With No Fix Available

Medium
USB flash drive beside a coin
Photo by EU+Mexico on Wikimedia Commons

Siemens has disclosed CVE-2026-58114, a weak authentication flaw that affects fourteen SIMATIC product lines widely deployed across the Critical Manufacturing sector worldwide. The affected software includes SIMATIC WinCC V7.5, V8.0 and V8.1, SIMATIC WinCC Runtime Professional V17 through V21, SIMATIC PCS 7 V9.1, SIMATIC BATCH V9.1, SIMATIC Process Historian 2020 and 2022, and SIMATIC Information Server 2020 and 2022 — in every case all versions of those releases are listed as known affected. The issue carries a CVSS v3 base score of 7.5 and is described as an authentication bypass that could let an on-path attacker take over the session of a legitimate user and execute arbitrary code with that user's privileges. Siemens is preparing fixes and has published mitigation guidance, but for several of the products the advisory states that no fix is currently available, and for SIMATIC BATCH V9.1, PCS 7 V9.1, Process Historian 2020 and 2022, and Information Server 2020 and 2022 it states that no fix is planned at all. Any plant running these engineering, visualisation or historian components on a Windows network should treat itself as in scope.

The root cause is that the affected systems do not properly secure remote user authentication when the deprecated NTLM protocol is used. An unauthenticated remote attacker who has first achieved a machine-in-the-middle position on the network can relay that NTLM authentication to another service and impersonate the legitimate user, without ever needing to recover a password. Siemens notes that the potential impact depends entirely on which services are reachable from the relay point, giving the example of a SQL Server instance used by WinCC — the database that underpins tag logging, alarms and historian data in these deployments. Beyond that description the vendor has not published a detailed exploitation chain or proof-of-concept code. The single remediation offered today is a configuration change rather than a code fix: customers are pointed to Siemens documentation describing how to manually configure the SQL Server database to encrypt its communication, which denies the attacker the clear-text relay path.

The practical risk sits in how these systems are normally deployed. WinCC, PCS 7 and the historian products typically run on flat, trusted control-network segments where NTLM is still routinely used for machine-to-machine and operator logons, and where domain hardening lags well behind the corporate IT estate. A successful relay against a SIMATIC operator station or its backing SQL Server would hand an attacker the identity of an engineer or operator, with the corresponding ability to read process data, alter configuration, or run code on a host that sits directly alongside production control. The prerequisite is meaningful and does raise the bar: the attacker must already hold an on-path position inside the network, meaning this is realistically a post-foothold lateral movement and credential relay problem rather than an internet-facing entry point. On current exploitation status, FIRST EPSS puts the probability of exploitation in the next thirty days at 0.3 percent, the flaw does not appear in the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalogue, and neither Siemens nor CISA reports any observed exploitation in the wild. What makes this one worth tracking past the usual patch cycle is its permanence — with no fix planned for six of the affected product lines, the exposure for those plants becomes a long-term architectural condition to be managed through network design and database configuration rather than something an update will eventually close.

Attack Surface

Infrastructure, Database, Server OS

Tactics

Credential Access, Lateral Movement, Collection

Techniques

  • T1557 – Adversary-in-the-Middle
  • T1557.001 – LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay
  • T1550 – Use Alternate Authentication Material
  • T1078 – Valid Accounts

SuperPRO's Threat Countermeasures Procedures

  1. Apply the Siemens mitigation for CVE-2026-58114 by manually configuring the SQL Server database behind WinCC, PCS 7, Process Historian, Information Server and SIMATIC BATCH to encrypt its communication, following Siemens support document 109818202 — this is the only remediation offered for the products marked no fix planned.
  2. Inventory and flag every host running an affected release: SIMATIC WinCC V7.5, V8.0, V8.1, WinCC Runtime Professional V17 to V21, PCS 7 V9.1, SIMATIC BATCH V9.1, Process Historian 2020 and 2022, and Information Server 2020 and 2022 — all versions of each are listed as known affected.
  3. Enable Extended Protection for Authentication (channel binding) on the SQL Server instances used by WinCC and enforce SMB signing via the Group Policy settings Microsoft network server: Digitally sign communications (always) and Microsoft network client: Digitally sign communications (always), as both break NTLM relay to those services.
  4. Audit NTLM usage with the Group Policy setting Network security: Restrict NTLM: Audit NTLM authentication in this domain, then move SIMATIC service and operator accounts to Kerberos and restrict outgoing NTLM traffic where the audit shows no dependency.
  5. Disable LLMNR via the Group Policy setting Turn off multicast name resolution and disable NetBIOS over TCP/IP on SIMATIC and control-network adapters, removing the name-resolution poisoning route commonly used to obtain the machine-in-the-middle position this flaw requires.
  6. Restrict TCP/445, TCP/135 and TCP/1433 to explicitly approved control-network hosts at the firewall separating the plant network from the enterprise LAN, and ensure no SIMATIC server or SQL Server instance is reachable from the internet or from general corporate subnets.
  7. Alert in the SIEM on Windows Security Event ID 4624 logons with Authentication Package NTLM and Logon Type 3 against SIMATIC servers, and on Event ID 4776 entries where the source workstation name does not match a known engineering station, as these are the signatures of relayed credentials from tools such as Responder or ntlmrelayx.

Source

Code Red Cyber / VTA – coderedcyber.ai